Stove argues that Popper and his successors in the philosophy of science, Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend, were irrationalists because they were deductivists. That is, they believed all logic is deductive, and thus denied that experimental evidence could make scientific theories logically more probable. The book was reprinted as Anything Goes (1998) and Scientific Irrationalism: Origins of a Postmodern Cult (1998).

In his private notes written in 1936 (now published as GA82), Heidegger enumerates three “fundamental deceptions” at play in Being and Time (1927). The thrust of these deceptions is twofold: that Dasein is something given and that the task of phenomenology is to describe Dasein in its givenness. These are deceptions, Heidegger claims in 1936, because Dasein is not something given, but can only be reached in a leap, and because the task of phenomenology is not to describe Dasein in (...) its givenness, but to bring about Dasein and the “there,” the site of Being’s happening, through a creative leap-in. Scholars might be inclined to read these deceptions as further evidence for the view that Heidegger in the 1930s abandons phenomenology understood as a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness. This paper argues, to the contrary, that phenomenology for the young Heidegger was never a descriptive enterprise oriented toward givenness, but always, however obliquely presented throughout the 1920s, a way of participating in the creative unfolding of the site of Being’s happening. (shrink)

The Stoic is often seen as the forerunner of Adam Smith’s market man of morals, but others have suggested that the sophist played a role in the formation of market morality and political economy. This article traces Smith’s treatment of ancient sophists and his use of the term sophistry in the Wealth of Nations. Smith praised ancient sophists for their effective didactic oratory and their ability to make money through teaching. Smith criticized arguments as sophistic when they promoted monetary advantage (...) for a few over and above the principle of competition. This varied reception of sophists and sophistry suggests a keen understanding of the rhetorical tradition and its capacity to influence the development of the discourse of political economy. Smith’s use of sophistry and reference to the sophists invites a deeper awareness of the essential vitality of effective argumentation for Smith’s “system of natural liberty. (shrink)

In this insightful, provocative essay, Stove builds a case for the claim that when benevolence is universal, disinterested and external, it regularly leads to ...

The Great Financial Crisis that broke in 2008 and the Great Recession that followed has led many to question the very structure of contemporary economies. Some argue that the economic model of the past forty years is now broken. Criticism has also been directed at the orthodoxies of economics. For example, neoclassical equilibrium economics, the mainstream economics of the day, is accused of failing to understand some of the most basic aspects of the modern economy, of supporting policies that have (...) led to the economic breakdown, and of failing to see the crisis coming. Consequently, heterodox thinking in economics is getting a hearing as never before. Heterodox economics offers itself as the requisite radical reconstruction of the science of economics and also proposes policies for the radical reconstruction of the major economics.Yet to talk of the reconstruction of the modern market economy is at the same time to raise the ethical question: what shape ought the market economy to take? Heterodox economics may acutely analyse the inadequacies of real economies and propose plausible reforms, but as an essentially descriptive science there will be limits on its ability to state what ought to be. Rather, what is required seems to be a systematic prescriptive ethics. In other words, recent events in the world of economics have provided an opening for what ethical philosophy should be best at providing. Determining whether a specific ethical philosophy, to be identified shortly, has the capacity to address the questions raised by heterodox economics is the task of this paper. (shrink)

Writing on the justification of certain inductive inferences, the author proposes that sometimes induction is justified and that arguments to prove otherwise are not cogent. In the first part he defends the argument of D.C. Williams' The Ground of Induction that induction is justified as a matter of logic by the proportional syllogism: "The vast majority of large samples match the population, therefore (probably) this sample matches the population"). In the second part he deals with such topics as deductive logic (...) (arguing that deductive logic is not formal), the theory of logical probability, and probability and truth. (shrink)

A stellar group of philosophers offer new works on themes from the great philosophy of Wittgenstein, honoring one of his most eminent interpreters David Pears. This collection covers both the early and the later work of Wittgenstein, relating it to current debates in philosophy. Topics discussed include solipsism, ostension, rules, necessity, privacy, and consciousness.

A recognizable topological model construction shows that any consistent principles of classical set theory, including the validity of the law of the excluded third, together with a standard class theory, do not suffice to demonstrate the general validity of the law of the excluded third. This result calls into question the classical mathematician's ability to offer solid justifications for the logical principles he or she favors.

The present paper is one installment in a lengthy task, the replacement of atomistic interpretations of Wittgenstein's Tractatus by a wholistic interpretation on which the world-in-logical-space is not constructed out of objects but objects are abstracted from out of that space. Here, general arguments against atomism are directed toward a specific target, the four aspects of the atomistic reading of Tractatus given in the Hintikkas' Investigating Wittgenstein (Hintikka & Hintikka 1986). The aspects in question are called the semantical, metaphysical, epistemological (...) and formal.What follows a précis of the Hintikkas' rendering of Wittgenstein's perspective is a characterization of the wholistic interpretation, comparing Wittgenstein's world and the transcendental conditions it sets upon possible notation to a blank page and the conditions it sets upon what is about to be written there. There will not be occasion to bring arguments against each plank in the atomist's platform or in support of each facet of wholism. But there is an extended treatment of the first two aspects — the semantical and metaphysical — which takes off from Wittgenstein's determination that, in his hands, logic must take care of itself. (shrink)

Reprint of Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists. In an afterword, James Franklin discusses reactions to Stove's work.

An interview with Charles McCarty by Piotr Urbańczyk concerning mathematical explanation.

Abstract:Dwelling near Lake Superior in the Anthropocene, we uncover a greater intimacy and acquaintance with our earthly responsibilities. Thoughts wash over us like waves as our thinking ebbs and flows between the fact that we must learn to dwell here while also coming to terms with the planetary implications of our very being. That ebb and flow is presented here in a series of waves, which can be read in or out of order, in an orderly or disorderly fashion. These (...) waves crash into one another as we reflect on place, dwelling, hospitality, deep history, enchantment, wildness, and thinking itself. We discover in this mixture an invitation to think more deeply about our responsibilities by contemplating one of the other bodies with which we cohabit the earth: the deep, blue body of Lake Superior. (shrink)

[David Charles] Aristotle, it appears, sometimes identifies well-being with one activity, sometimes with several, including ethical virtue. I argue that this appearance is misleading. In the Nicomachean Ethics, intellectual contemplation is the central case of human well-being, but is not identical with it. Ethically virtuous activity is included in human well-being because it is an analogue of intellectual contemplation. This structure allows Aristotle to hold that while ethically virtuous activity is valuable in its own right, the best life (...) available for humans is centred around, but not wholly constituted by, intellectual contemplation. /// [Dominic Scott] In Nicomachean Ethics X 7-8, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of eudaimonia, primary and secondary. The first corresponds to contemplation, the second to activity in accordance with moral virtue and practical reason. My task in this paper is to elucidate this distinction. Like Charles, I interpret it as one between paradigm and derivative cases; unlike him, I explain it in terms of similarity, not analogy. Furthermore, once the underlying nature of the distinction is understood, we can reconcile the claim that paradigm eudaimonia consists just in contemplation with a passage in the first book requiring eudaimonia to involve all intrinsic goods. (shrink)

While much literature has sprouted on peer review, this is the first book-length, wide-ranging study that utilizes methods and resources of contemporary philosophy. It covers the tension between peer review and the liberal notion that truth emerges when ideas proliferate in the marketplace of ideas; arguments for and against blind review of submissions; the alleged conservatism of peer review; the anomalous nature of book reviewing; the status of non-peer-reviewed publications; and the future of peer review.

This chapter examines the writings of Modern Orthodox thinkers. To frame the discussion, it focuses on a so-called maximalist Modern Orthodox position consisting of four assertions, each of which is discussed in turn: the validity thesis, the knowledge thesis, the jurisprudential thesis; the reconciliation thesis. The four components of the maximalist Modern Orthodox positions have varying degrees of textual, philosophical, and empirical support. Perhaps the deepest problem confronting a Modern Orthodox thinker is how a decisor can trust his ethical judgments, (...) given that some of God's commands strike people as immoral and human judgment therefore appears to be deeply flawed. (shrink)

First published in the most ambitious international philosophy project for a generation; the _Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy_. _Logic from A to Z_ is a unique glossary of terms used in formal logic and the philosophy of mathematics. Over 500 entries include key terms found in the study of: * Logic: Argument, Turing Machine, Variable * Set and model theory: Isomorphism, Function * Computability theory: Algorithm, Turing Machine * Plus a table of logical symbols. Extensively cross-referenced to help comprehension and add (...) detail, _Logic from A to Z_ provides an indispensable reference source for students of all branches of logic. (shrink)

Jewish tradition presents a variety of theodicies. Job and some Talmudic passages apparently reject the notion that all suffering is punishment for sin, even though it is also taught, ostensibly to the contrary, that a sufferer should react by mending his or her ways. The tradition also allows a large enough scope to natural law to allow for a soul‐making theodicy, according to which suffering occurs naturally and the negative value of suffering is outweighed by the positive value of opportunities (...) for the sufferer and others to exercise virtues. It can also admit a theodicy that stresses the sufferer's ability to achieve, through suffering, closeness to God. Finally, antitheodicies – theistic views, often existentialist, that oppose constructing theodicies – collapse into soul‐making theodicies. Thus, soul‐making theodicies have a home in Judaism, though they are from the only explanation of suffering in Jewish tradition. They afford the most promising theodicy for Jewish thought. (shrink)

Anyone who labors at academic scholarship knows vividly—perhaps even painfully—how dependent that enterprise is on a system of peer review. A scholar submits a work to a journal, press, or conference committee, or sends a proposal to a foundation; the submission is then evaluated by other professionals. The judgment of these referees determines whether the work is published by the target journal or press, appears on the conference program, or is funded by the desired institution. In many fields the overwhelming (...) majority of submissions are rejected. Careers are thus often made or destroyed by the process. (shrink)

David Charles; XII*—Rationality and Irrationality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 83, Issue 1, 1 June 1983, Pages 191–212, https://doi.org/10.1.

Aristotle initiated the systematic investigation of perception, the emotions, memory, desire, and action. David Charles argues that Aristotle's account of these phenomena is a philosophically live alternative to conventional modern thinking about the mind: it offers a way to dissolve, rather than solve, the mind-body problem we have inherited.

David Charles presents a major new study of Aristotle's views on meaning, essence, necessity, and related topics. These interconnected views are central to Aristotle's metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of science, and are also highly relevant to current philosophical debates. Charles aims to reach a clear understanding of Aristotle's claims and arguments, to assess their truth, and to evaluate their importance to ancient and modern philosophy.

This paper is a reply to James Keller 's criticisms of my Foundationalism, Coherentism and the Levels Gambit.Foundationalists have often claimed that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles in a mediate, empirical fashion, while escaping the charge of vicious circularity that is usually thought to afflict such methods of justification. In my original paper I attacked this foundationalist strategy; I argued that once mediate, empirical justification of epistemic principles is allowed, the foundationalist must also allow (...) circular patterns of justification of the sort that he typically criticizes coherentists for espousing. Here I argue that Keller 's reply only makes matters worse for the foundationalist. At several points, his reply turns out to be inconsistent either with reliabilism or with the foundationalist strategy he is trying to defend. (shrink)

A central problem in epistemology concerns the justification of beliefs about epistemic principles, i.e., principles stating which kinds of beliefs are justified and which not. It is generally regarded as circular to justify such beliefs empirically. However, some recent defenders of foundationalism have argued that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles empirically without incurring the charge of vicious circularity. The key to this position is a sharp distinction between first- and second-level justifiedness.In this paper I (...) first argue that such versions of foundationalism end up giving their approval to circular chains and are therefore unmotivated; if circular chains are acceptable, the classic regress argument for foundationalism does not go through. I then consider and reject two other ways in which the foundationalist might motivate his position. At the end of the paper I draw from this discussion a moral concerning the airns of epistemological theorizing. (shrink)